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 3  God and moral knowledge 
 Dustin  Crummett and  Philip  Swenson 
 1.  Introduction 
 Daniel Dennett has observed that “[t]here is a lot of goodness in this world, 
and more goodness every day.” 1 Surely we can all agree with at least the 
fi rst part of his claim (and there is a good case for the second). Happiness 
and friendship are good. And advancement in medicine and the reduction of 
poverty continue to make the world better. We know that Dennett is correct 
because we know that many things are good. And we know that promoting 
these goods is often morally right. We also know of many bad things. We 
know suffering is bad. And we know that acts like racial discrimination and 
harming the innocent are morally wrong. This is  moral knowledge . 
 In this chapter, we will investigate the ramifi cations of moral knowledge 
for naturalism (roughly, the view that all that exists is the natural world). 
Specifi cally, we will draw attention to a certain problem we face if the world 
is purely naturalistic. We will then show how theism provides resources for 
solving this problem. We’ll argue that the fact that we have lots of moral 
knowledge fi ts better with theism than with naturalism. Specifi cally, we’ll 
present reasons to think that (1) naturalists who think we have lots of moral 
knowledge will have trouble rationally maintaining both their naturalism 
and their belief that we have such knowledge and (2) theism better explains 
the fact that we have lots of moral knowledge than naturalism does. Simi-
lar arguments might show a confl ict between the existence of lots of moral 
knowledge and some views besides naturalism, but we will focus on natu-
ralism due to its popularity among many philosophers and among the New 
Atheists to whom this book is addressed. 
 To display the problem we have in mind for naturalism, we begin with an 
analogy. Suppose you have no idea what time it is, and you see a clock. If 
you think the clock is stopped, you shouldn’t believe what it says. Of course, 
the clock  might be right; it will be, twice a day. But you shouldn’t trust it. If 
it’s correct, it will be because of luck, not because it is trustworthy. And if 
you did trust it and it turned out to be correct, then even though you were 
right, we wouldn’t say that you  knew what time it was. You placed your 
trust in an untrustworthy source. You were correct only by accident. 
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 But suppose you know that the clock really is accurate. You check your 
watch and the time matches. It’s  possible that the clock is stopped and just 
happens to be showing the right time, and if you obtained strong enough 
evidence that this was true (maybe you see it doesn’t have a battery), you 
might have to conclude that the clock displays the right time by chance. But 
the hypothesis that the clock was set to the right time and is working prop-
erly seems like a much better explanation of the fact that the clock shows 
the right time. Accordingly, absent very strong evidence to the contrary, you 
should believe the clock is working properly. 
 The problem is that, with naturalism, the faculties we use to form moral 
beliefs are ultimately the result of natural processes that weren’t aimed at 
giving us  true moral beliefs, but were instead aimed at giving us beliefs 
which (say) maximize reproductive fi tness. We’ll argue that moral truth 
and reproductive fi tness don’t seem to be connected in the right way for 
such a process to be likely to produce knowledge: if we wound up with 
true moral beliefs, we would do so only in a problematically accidental 
way, just like the stopped clock occasionally provides the correct time 
only in a problematically accidental way. Meanwhile, with theism, God 
exists, knows the moral truths, and has the ability to bring it about that 
we have the capacity to know the moral truths (either through intervening 
in the world or by setting up natural processes in the right way). Further, 
it’s easy to see why God might be motivated to bring it about that we 
have moral knowledge. Theism can provide a nonaccidental connection 
between our moral beliefs and the moral truths, just as there would be a 
nonaccidental connection between the time on the clock and the actual 
time if a knowledgeable and competent agent set the clock to display the 
correct time. 
 You might wonder how God could come to have moral knowledge. Are 
we just pushing the problem back a step if we appeal to God’s knowledge 
in order to explain human moral knowledge? Some theists will account for 
God’s moral knowledge by claiming that moral facts depend on God’s will, 
desires, or character. For example, maybe keeping promises is right because 
God wants people to keep their promises. A worry for this proposal is that 
it seems to make morality depend on something arbitrary. Why does God 
want promises kept rather than broken? It can’t be because keeping prom-
ises is right. That would be circular. 
 Here is a suggestion we like better. You might fi nd it plausible that a 
human being could not become a tree. If you tried to turn Bob the human 
into a tree, you would kill him. (Even if you ended up with a tree at the end, 
it wouldn’t be Bob.) The reason for this is that Bob is not the kind of thing 
that can be a tree. His nature or essence is incompatible with being a tree. 
Traditional theists construe God as essentially believing all truths. In this 
view, God is  not the kind of thing that can fail to have all true beliefs about 
morality. So God’s own nature or essence accounts for God’s moral knowl-
edge. If God exists, God must have moral knowledge. 
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 However, some atheists will claim that it’s extremely implausible to think 
that anything has an essence like that—in other words, that it’s extremely 
implausible to think that God exists—and will claim that this rules theis-
tic explanations of moral knowledge out of bounds. Suppose an impor-
tant document disappears from a locked safe and all the usual explanations 
for how it could have happened seem insuffi cient (security camera footage 
shows that no one accessed the safe, etc.). One possibility is that the fl y-
ing spaghetti monster, whose noodly appendages can supernaturally pass 
through safes unimpeded, stole the document in an undetectable way. But 
although this theory can account for the disappearance of the document, 
it isn’t a satisfying explanation, because it seems extremely implausible on 
other grounds. If theism is similarly implausible, theistic explanations of 
moral knowledge might fail for the same reason. 
 We deny that theism is relevantly like the fl ying spaghetti monster. Theism 
possesses certain intrinsic features that make it appealing. For instance, it is 
comparatively very  simple : from just one property (perfection, or maximal 
value, or something like that), all of God’s essential attributes (being all-
powerful, all-knowing, and all-good) can be derived, and any inessential 
properties that God has can be explained in terms of God’s possession of 
these. 2 Further, as Joshua Rasmussen notes in his chapter in this book, God 
is free of arbitrary, unexplained properties. 3 On the other hand, the fl ying 
spaghetti monster would be incredibly complicated and incredibly arbitrary. 
(We can naturally ask questions like: why on earth is he made out of spa-
ghetti?) The fl ying spaghetti monster was invented to be a silly hypothesis, 
and it succeeds. But the features that make it silly aren’t possessed by the-
ism, so that, as a parody of theism, it fails. Further still, there are serious 
independent reasons to accept theism, some of which are surveyed in other 
chapters. In light of all this, while a naturalist will, of course, think theism 
is  unlikely , they shouldn’t think it’s totally ridiculous in the way that the 
fl ying spaghetti monster is. We should think they should be  open-minded
about theism, if it can be shown that theism fi ts better with certain facts 
than naturalism does. Of course, we are claiming here that the extent of our 
moral knowledge may be such a fact. 
 With that said, we don’t claim to be  absolutely certain that the argu-
ments we will present are sound. As is true of nearly all philosophical argu-
ments, intelligent people have presented sophisticated objections to them. 
But although we don’t expect to convince everyone, we think there is some-
thing to these arguments. And while we will not be able to recap the litera-
ture on them down to every last detail, we hope to give a sense of why we 
think these arguments are promising. We should further note that we are 
not claiming that naturalists don’t  have moral knowledge. Obviously they 
do. Our claim is instead about whether any of us would have moral knowl-
edge were naturalism true. 
 In the next section, we defend the claim that we have moral knowledge. In 
the third section, we discuss the confl ict between naturalism and the claim 
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that we have moral knowledge. In the fourth section, we discuss three ways 
one might attempt to reconcile naturalism and moral knowledge. One of 
these ways involves adopting moral subjectivism, the idea that moral truths 
somehow depend on human attitudes. Another involves claiming that the 
way in which moral terms get their meanings ensures that we are likely to 
be correct about what they are. The third involves claiming that our moral 
beliefs are accurate because natural processes, while not aimed directly at 
moral accuracy, are aimed at something that is roughly correlated with 
moral accuracy. We give some reasons for being skeptical of each of these 
views. In the fi nal section, we say a bit more about theistic explanations of 
our moral knowledge. 
 2.  Moral knowledge 
 Our argument requires that human beings have lots of moral knowledge. 
We certainly grant that humans are fallible about morality. But almost eve-
ryone thinks they know a fair amount about it. For example, you probably 
think you know facts like “hurting people just for fun is morally bad” and 
“slavery is morally wrong.” There are some holdouts. Moral skeptics deny 
that we have any moral knowledge. But this is a rare and extreme view, and 
the endorsement of moral knowledge is part of common sense. If something 
seems obvious to you and nearly every other reasonable person, then that’s a 
powerful reason to believe it. Otherwise, it’s hard to see how we could ever 
be justifi ed in believing anything about the world at all: believing anything 
about the world at all seems to require, ultimately, trusting that how things 
seem is at least a somewhat reliable guide to how they are. Of course, it 
sometimes turns out that how things seem is  not how they are, and we should 
sometimes abandon beliefs about things that seemed obvious when we have 
suffi ciently good reasons for doing so. But the point is that we shouldn’t 
abandon such beliefs  without suffi ciently good reasons for doing so. 
 Our argument will make the case that naturalists may be forced to aban-
don either their naturalism or their belief that we have moral knowledge. 
The idea now is just that, given how clear the existence of a substantial 
amount of moral knowledge is to most sane people, abandoning belief in 
it should be done only as a last resort. (Note that we are not currently 
assuming that morality is objective. We are just claiming that there is moral 
knowledge. If some form of moral relativism or subjectivism is true, people 
still know something about morality. It’s just that what they know about is 
a subjective domain. We address subjectivism in Section 4.) 
 Furthermore, many prominent atheists are committed to the claim that 
we have, or at least are in a position to get, lots of moral knowledge. Sam 
Harris famously endorses moral knowledge in his book  The Moral Land-
scape (2010). And atheistic critics of religion argue that various religious 
teachings or practices are immoral. Richard Dawkins, for example, criti-
cizes the God of the Old Testament as unjust. 4 Clearly, one can’t justifi ably 
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condemn teachings or practices as immoral if one doesn’t have a good idea 
of what sorts of things are immoral. Those who think that some such cri-
tiques  succeed—at least who think they  could succeed, assuming that the 
sorts of claims these atheists make about the morality of various religions 
are  correct—should grant that they know some moral facts. 
 3.  The confl ict 
 Our moral beliefs ultimately depend, in some way, on what philosophers 
call “moral intuitions.” When we consider certain moral claims, we can 
just “see” whether they’re true: we can see that (at least absent extenuat-
ing circumstances) hatred is bad, virtue is good, killing innocent people is 
wrong, etc. With these intuitions in place, we can reason and make our 
moral judgments more accurate. For instance, initially we might not think 
that factory farming is wrong. However, once we realize that causing suffer-
ing without a good enough reason is wrong, that producing cheaper meat 
is not a good enough reason for producing tremendous suffering, and that 
factory farming causes tremendous suffering in order to produce cheaper 
meat, we might change our minds. But this requires that we trust our intui-
tions: we wouldn’t be able to reason our way to the wrongness of factory 
farming without intuitively grasping the wrongness of causing suffering and 
the insuffi ciency of producing cheap meat as a justifi cation for it. 
 The problem for the naturalist here is that, if naturalism is true, it seems 
that the faculties responsible for our intuitions were formed through purely 
natural processes that didn’t aim at producing true beliefs. For instance, it 
seems plausible that our intuition that you shouldn’t cause pain without 
a good reason was instilled in us by evolution, since communities of our 
ancestors who fl ippantly infl icted harm on each other wouldn’t have lasted. 
But this might unnerve the naturalist who believes in moral knowledge. 
After all, it seems that we might have easily had very different moral intui-
tions. For instance, Charles Darwin suggested that: 
 If . . . men were reared under precisely the same conditions as hive-
bees . . . our unmarried females would, like the worker-bees, think it a 
sacred duty to kill their brothers, and mothers would strive to kill their 
fertile daughters, and no one would think of interfering. 
 ( 1902 , 137) 
 Similarly, the philosopher Mark  Linville (2009 , 397) suggests that 
 Wolves in a pack know their place in the social hierarchy. A lower-
ranked wolf feels compelled to give way to the alpha male. Were he 
endowed with [moral thoughts], then, presumably, his “moral sense” 
would tell him that obeisance is his moral duty. He would regard it as a 
moral fact that alpha interests trump beta or omega interests. 
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 In light of this, the philosopher Sharon Street, who has done as much as 
anyone to draw attention to this issue, suggests that trusting moral faculties 
that have been formed by such natural processes might seem to be 
 analogous to setting out for Bermuda and letting the course of your 
boat be determined by the wind and tides: just as the push of the wind 
and tides on your boat has nothing to do with where you want to go, so 
the historical push of natural selection on the content of our evaluative 
judgements has nothing to do with evaluative truth. 
 While this historical push might sometimes give us correct beliefs, this would 
be “purely a matter of chance” (2006, 121–122). 
 Further, with naturalism, how the moral domain is doesn’t seem to 
explain why we hold the beliefs we do; even if these beliefs are true, we don’t 
hold them  because of how anything in the moral domain is, but instead 
because beliefs like that helped our ancestors survive. As we discuss in Sec-
tion 4.3, even if we  couldn’t have easily had very different, and therefore 
largely incorrect, moral intuitions, this fact might be enough to make it the 
case that, if our beliefs are true, they are true only by accident in a way that 
rules out knowledge. 
 Once we realize this, our moral judgments might seem, with naturalism, 
to look like the stopped clock: just as it’s a happy accident if the clock hap-
pens to be stopped on the right time, what a happy accident that we wound 
up with a roughly correct set of intuitions! There are various ways natural-
ists might respond to this worry. Sharon Street suggests that we must give up 
on the “realist’s independent evaluative truths” and endorses a sophisticated 
form of subjectivism. We explain why we reject this in Section 4.1. Alex-
ander  Rosenberg (2009 ) claims that we should accept moral  nihilism , the 
view that our moral judgments are false and that morality is an illusion. We 
explained why we reject this in Section 4.2. Still others attempt to reconcile 
naturalism with moral  realism , the view that there are moral facts independ-
ent of human attitudes that we have some knowledge of. We argue against 
two such attempts in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. 
 4.  Three possible responses 
 4.1.  Subjectivism 
 One possible response to the problem laid out earlier involves accepting 
moral subjectivism . One famous form of subjectivism is  moral relativism , 
which claims that moral truths vary according to human standards. One 
type is  cultural relativism , which, in its simplest form, claims that actions 
are right just in case the standards of the society in which they’re performed 
says that they’re right, wrong if those standards say they’re wrong, etc. 
Morality would then be kind of like etiquette. Actions that are rude here can 
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be polite elsewhere, because politeness and rudeness are relative to which 
etiquette standards a culture accepts. For instance, burping loudly after eat-
ing is rude in the United States, but might be acceptable someplace where 
it’s viewed as a sign that you enjoyed the meal. Cultural relativists think that 
morality works in a similar way. They aren’t just making the obvious claim 
that which actions people  think are right or wrong can vary from culture 
to culture. What they claim is that which actions  really are right or wrong 
vary depending on cultural standards, even when the actions are performed 
in otherwise equivalent situations. Whether people  think the earth is fl at has 
varied between times and places, but this has had no impact on whether the 
earth really was fl at; some people were just wrong. This is different from eti-
quette, where changing standards really do change which actions are polite. 
Relativists think morality is like etiquette rather than like the earth’s shape. 
 If this view is true, our argument fails. There would be no mystery about 
how we wound up with the right moral beliefs, just as there is no mystery 
about how we wound up with the right beliefs about etiquette: in both 
cases, what’s right is just whatever we say is right. It would be true that, like 
the stopped clock, that the beliefs are true wouldn’t explain why we have 
them. But this would be because the fact that we have them explains why 
they’re true. 
 But relativism of this sort is extremely implausible, and almost everyone 
rejects it once they understand its implications. It entails that if a society 
says that slavery is okay and fi ghting to end slavery is wrong, then slav-
ery there really is okay, and people who fi ght to abolish slavery are acting 
wrongly. Clearly, this contradicts how things seem. Someone who fi ghts to 
end slavery in a society that views it as a good thing is a moral visionary, 
not a wrongdoer. Because cultural relativism has false implications, it must 
be false. 
 Other forms of relativism say that morality is relative to something 
besides cultural standards, but they run into similar problems. For instance, 
individual moral relativism, in its simplest form, says that which actions 
are right or wrong is relative to individuals: the morality of my actions is 
determined by my own moral standards, and the morality of yours by yours. 
But this is clearly false, too. It implies that the actions of a racist are right, 
as long as the racist is living up to their own standards. In response to this, 
philosophers have developed other, more sophisticated forms of subjectiv-
ism. For instance, we might claim that what matters is not what people 
actually think is right, but what they  would think was right if they were fully 
informed about all the other facts of the situation and if their beliefs were 
perfectly consistent. Since most racists are misinformed about many facts 
and have many inconsistent beliefs, maybe they would abandon their racism 
if they were more informed and rational. This represents an improvement. 
But although we cannot discuss every view like this in all its detail, we sus-
pect that these more sophisticated views will ultimately fail for reasons simi-
lar to those that undermined the cruder forms of subjectivism we discussed 
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earlier. In principle, if someone’s conscience was messed up enough, it seems 
that they might approve of racism even if they met the conditions mentioned 
earlier. 5 But clearly racism would still be wrong, even if everyone thought 
this way. 
 In light of problems like this, we accept moral realism. In this view, 
instead of the moral facts conforming to whatever our moral standards are, 
in developing moral standards, we should try to develop ones that conform 
to the objective moral facts. If this is right, the relativist response to our 
argument fails, because it reintroduces the possibility that our moral beliefs 
could have seriously failed to conform. 
 4.2.  Moral language 
 A subtly different potential response to our argument accepts realism but 
suggests that how words get their meanings accounts for the accuracy of 
our moral beliefs. It claims that, because the words we use in talking about 
morality derive their meaning from our linguistic practices, it is no surprise 
that we have accurate moral beliefs: if our moral beliefs had been very dif-
ferent, our moral words would have referred to different properties, so that 
our beliefs would have been fairly accurate no matter what. Consider: 
Boat Case: Suppose you crash-landed on an alien planet where people 
spoke a language very similar to English. You notice an odd behavior. 
The aliens are regularly pointing to vehicles fl oating on the water and 
saying, “That’s a nice car.” They also ask you if you want to “go for a 
car ride on the lake.” 
 You might think the aliens are woefully uninformed about the nature of cars, 
but that would be a mistake. Rather, you should realize that their word “cars” 
refers to what we call “boats.” The way they use the term “car” has resulted 
in “car” having a meaning in their language that makes most of what they 
say about “cars” true. 6 There is no mystery about how either we or the aliens 
wound up using the words correctly: the meaning of “car” in their language 
is determined by how they use the word, and the same is true for us. 
 These claims don’t entail relativism about cars and boats. There are per-
fectly objective facts about what’s a car or a boat, and a car wouldn’t change 
into a boat, or vice versa, if one was fl own back and forth between our 
planets. It’s just that we have different words for referring to the same objec-
tively existing things, and, confusingly, we use words that sound the same 
to refer to different things. 
 Someone could claim that something similar is true for talk about moral-
ity. We apply the word “right” to certain actions, say, actions that promote 
happiness, and this, the objector claims, is enough for the word “right” to 
refer to those actions. In a way, “right” is just another name for promoting 
happiness, just as, say, “water” is just another name for H 2 O. If we had 
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used the word differently, it would have referred to whatever we applied it 
to instead, and we would have been correct then, too. (For instance, if mur-
der was the only thing we ever called “right,” then we could have truly said 
“murder is right,” because the word “right” would then refer to murder.) 
 This claim about moral language is not a form of moral relativism, just 
as our judgment about the Boat Case doesn’t lead to relativism about boats. 
In this view, it’s correct to say that slavery is wrong even in societies where 
it’s accepted (since rightness involves, say, promoting happiness, and slavery 
doesn’t promote happiness overall). It thereby seems to avoid some of rela-
tivism’s false implications. At the same time, the objector claims, this view 
is still enough to solve the problem of moral knowledge. Whatever we had 
called right would have been the referent of our word “right.” So there is 
again no mystery about our accuracy. 
 The problem is that this view doesn’t seem to refl ect the way moral terms 
actually work. Consider the following: 
Bad Aliens Case: You crash-land on an alien planet where people speak 
a language very similar to English. You notice that the aliens do not 
seem to care at all about left-handed people. They say enslaving left-
handed people is right if it produces even a tiny benefi t for the non–left-
handed. Otherwise, their moral talk and practice are very similar to 
Earth’s (e.g., they agree that if an action is “wrong,” it’s very important 
not to do it). 7
 This scenario seems importantly different from the Boat Case. When we 
say “enslaving left-handed people is wrong” and they say “enslaving left-
handed people is right,” it seems clear that we  disagree . This isn’t true when 
we say “cars don’t go on water” and they say “cars do go on water”: there, 
we are just talking past one another, because our word “car” means some-
thing different from theirs. We can both be right, and in fact we both are. 
(It’s as if I said “banks”—meaning a fi nancial institution—“are meant for 
storing money” and you said that banks—meaning a riverbank—aren’t.) 
But we and the aliens can’t both be right about morality. In fact, they are 
very seriously mistaken. 
 This verdict suggests that our moral language doesn’t work in the way the 
objector suggests and that it is not true that “right” would have picked out 
whatever we happened to call right. Rather, we (like the aliens) could have 
been completely in the dark about which things really are right without our 
word “right” having a different meaning. Exactly how our word “right” 
does work is a complicated question in the philosophy of language, but we 
don’t need to pursue that here. Agreeing with our verdict about the Bad 
Aliens Case is enough to show that whether claims of the form “X is good” 
are true is not determined just by which things we say are good, and that’s 
enough to defeat this objection. The aliens are wrong about morality. Their 
use of moral terms does not make them accurate. Are we doing better? 
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 4.3.  Third-factor explanations 
 Suppose a naturalist agrees that nothing in the moral domain explains why 
we have the moral beliefs we do. Suppose they also agree that our moral 
beliefs don’t explain the moral facts. They might still attempt to recon-
cile moral knowledge and naturalism by claiming that natural processes, 
although not aimed directly at moral accuracy, are aimed at some third 
thing that is roughly correlated with moral accuracy. In this case, even 
though these processes did not aim at accuracy, they could not easily have 
been wildly inaccurate. 
 One version of this response has been defended by, among others, the phi-
losopher David  Enoch (2010 ). Evolutionary processes give us moral beliefs 
that promote survival: they tend toward making us think that the things 
that promote survival are good. Fortunately, promoting survival actually 
does tend to be good, so we wind up with beliefs about what’s good that 
are fairly accurate. Accordingly, the story goes, we could not have easily 
wound up with largely false moral beliefs, and this is enough to make them 
nonaccidental in the way needed for knowledge. Of course, Enoch must 
trust his moral intuitions—whose reliability is what’s in question—in order 
to believe that survival is good. This might seem circular, but perhaps it isn’t 
so bad: ultimately, we have no way to verify the reliability of our faculties 
without using our faculties, so (as we mentioned in Section 2) it may be that 
if we’re justifi ed in believing anything, we’re allowed to start by trusting 
how things seem to us. Our criticism of naturalism was not that natural-
ists have no way to prove that their faculties produce knowledge without 
using them, but rather that, given what they believe, they have good reason 
to think their faculties  don’t produce knowledge. But Enoch claims that a 
third-factor explanation allows us to see how, even if naturalism is true, our 
faculties can produce moral knowledge after all. 
 One worry with Enoch’s approach is that it does not appear to be suf-
fi cient to account for the full extent of our moral knowledge. Couldn’t it 
have easily turned out that most of the acts that were required to promote 
survival were bad overall, even though survival is good? Recall the discus-
sion from Section 3 about the sorts of beliefs that intelligent bees or wolves 
might hold: plausibly, fratricide and inegalitarianism would be wrong for 
them even though it promoted survival among their ancestors. If these evo-
lutionary infl uences would distort their moral intuitions enough that they 
would have much less moral knowledge than we do, it seems very lucky that 
we happen to have the evolutionary history we do. 
 There is also a deeper worry for third-factor explanations. They assume 
that showing that we don’t hold our moral beliefs  because of anything in 
the moral domain is a threat to moral knowledge, because this seems to 
show that we easily could have been mistaken, and then they attempt to 
show that we couldn’t easily have been mistaken. This assumption is called 
into question by an important recent paper by  Daniel Korman and Dustin 
15032-3224d-1pass-r01.indd   42 10/11/2019   12:43:29 PM
God and moral knowledge 43
Locke (forthcoming ). Korman and Locke suggest that the lack of an explan-
atory connection between the moral domain and our beliefs doesn’t pose a 
threat to knowledge because it shows that we could have easily been wrong. 
Instead, the lack of an explanatory connection between the moral domain 
and our beliefs is itself enough to defeat knowledge and, once we recognize 
it, to make us unjustifi ed in holding our belief. To argue for this, they pre-
sent cases like the following: 
 On the basis of clear and distinct intuitions, Neora believes in an all-
powerful deity. Later, Agent Smith convinces her that she is part of a 
computer simulation. He tells her that the designers had a terrible time 
building a simulation inhabited by conscious cognizers but that—through 
a great deal of trial and error—they found that they could achieve this 
result only by rendering the inhabitants strongly disposed to believe in 
an all-powerful deity. Without such beliefs, the simulations would break 
down before they even got going. Neora believes everything he tells her. 
And she believes that the deity (if it does exist) had nothing to do with 
her religious intuitions and associated beliefs. Despite believing all this, 
she doesn’t abandon her belief in an all-powerful deity. 
 (17) 
 It seems clear that Neora can’t justifi ably maintain both her belief in the 
deity and her belief that she ultimately holds it only because the program-
mers instilled it in her for reasons having nothing to do with anything in the 
theological domain. (Of course, things might be different if she thought that 
perhaps the deity had arranged it so that the programmers instilled the belief 
in her; then the existence of the deity might ultimately explain why she holds 
the belief after all. But suppose she thinks this isn’t true.) 
 The problem for Enoch is that Neora apparently takes herself to be in a 
position quite similar to the one that proponents of third-factor explana-
tions take themselves to be in. Suppose that (like Enoch) she starts out by 
giving the benefi t of the doubt to the sense in question and assuming that the 
deity exists. She’s then in a position to argue (like Enoch) that she couldn’t 
easily have been wrong: it wouldn’t be easy for an all-powerful being not to 
exist, and it wouldn’t have been easy for her not to believe in it (given that 
the programmers couldn’t get simulations where people don’t have such 
beliefs to work). So, we might imagine, she (like Enoch) concludes that she 
can hold her belief despite there being no explanatory connection between it 
and the theological domain, because, by her lights, she couldn’t have easily 
been wrong. But we just agreed that she can’t justifi ably maintain her belief 
in the deity while also maintaining her belief in what Smith told her. It seems 
clear that there is a serious problem here, whether or not we agree with the 
specifi c diagnosis given by Korman and Locke. 
 Of course, there are various ways that proponents of third-factor views 
might respond (and Korman and Locke anticipate and respond in turn to 
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some of them); this issue is complicated. But we are inclined to think that, 
even if we quibble with particular details of Korman and Locke’s account, 
there is something fi shy about third-factor explanations in this context, that 
they posit something that looks too close to a convenient accident. Note 
that although Korman and Locke attack third-factor explanations, they do 
not conclude that we should therefore reject moral realism. Instead, they 
think their argument shows that “realists must . . . embrace some account 
on which the moral facts explain our moral beliefs” (2). As we discuss in the 
next section, theism can provide such an account. 
 5.  God and moral knowledge 
 We are now in a position to give two arguments for preferring theism over 
naturalism. First, it looks like accepting naturalism rationally leads to moral 
skepticism. With naturalism, moral knowledge would be a happy accident 
of the sort we shouldn’t accept. So, naturalists appear to have two options: 
either (1) reject naturalism in favor of a competitor (such as theism) or 
(2) give up on moral knowledge. Insofar as you agree that we have good 
reason to resist moral skepticism and trust the commonsense view that there 
is moral knowledge, you have reason to go with option (1). 
 Someone might respond by claiming that because it seems obvious that 
we have moral knowledge, it’s rational for naturalists to believe that natural 
processes did give us many true moral beliefs, even if this requires accept-
ing a happy accident. It is crazier to deny moral knowledge than it is to 
conclude that we just got really lucky. This response is a version of the 
G. E. Moore Shift. The G. E. Moore Shift responds to skeptical arguments 
by asserting that the claim denied by the skeptic is more obvious than the 
assumptions of the skeptical argument. Here the naturalist is claiming that 
(1)  we have moral knowledge is more obvious than (2)  we should not accept 
that a happy accident occurred . Thus, they should reject (2). 
 Perhaps this argument shows that naturalists can be rational in believing 
we have moral knowledge (although the G. E. Moore Shift doesn’t seem 
like a good move in Neora’s case). But we think there is a further problem 
for the naturalist here. Theism can secure moral knowledge without having 
to posit a happy accident. Rather, God ensured that there would be some 
degree of alignment between our intuitions and moral truth. Thus, theism 
can provide an explanation of why our moral beliefs are often true. If the 
best naturalism can do is posit a happy accident, theism provides a better 
explanation of the existence of moral knowledge. 
 Of course, we have not shown that theism is true. There may be plausible 
rivals to both theism and naturalism that can explain why we have moral 
knowledge. And naturalism may have other advantages over theism that 
outweigh the advantage moral knowledge provides to theism. But we do 
think that the existence of moral knowledge favors theism over naturalism. 
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And we hope this chapter helps you see where we are coming from, even if 
you are not fully persuaded. 
 Notes 
 1  Dennett 2006 . 
 2  For instance, one of God’s features is that God believes that Dustin Crummett, one 
of the authors of this chapter, owns two adorable cats, Artemis and Apollo. This 
is not an essential property of God, since God could have existed without having 
this property. But this belief can ultimately be explained in terms of God’s essential 
attributes: God’s knowledge, power, and goodness explain why God created this 
world, whose features include Dustin Crummett owning Artemis and Apollo, and 
Dustin Crummett does own them—God’s being all-knowing explains why God 
knows that. 
 3  See also Miller 2018 (for an academic discussion) and Crummett 2018 (for a 
popular one). 
 4  E.g., Dawkins 2006 , 31. 
 5  We can’t derive a  logical contradiction from the claim that one race is superior 
to another, and someone could claim that one race being superior to another is 
just a basic, unexplained moral fact, without holding any false beliefs about what 
members of one race or another are like. 
 6  This case is inspired by Hilary Putnam’s “Twin Earth” example. See Putnam 1973 . 
 7  This case is inspired by Horgan and Timmons’s “Moral Twin Earth” example. See 
Horgan and Timmons 1991 . 
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